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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON		
9		AT SEA	
10	Kathy	Walker,	CASE NO. 2:09-cv-01750-MJP
11		Petitioner,	ORDER ON MOTION FOR
12		v.	DAMAGES
13	United States of America,		
14		Respondent.	
15			
16	The above-entitled Court, having received and reviewed		
17	1. Petitioner's Motion for Damages Against Respondent (Dkt. No. 14)		
18	2.	United States' Response in Opposition	to Plaintiff's Motion for Payment of Damages
19		to Vehicle (Dkt. No. 26)	
20	3.	Reply to Defendant's Response in Opp	osition to Plaintiff's Motion for Payment of
21		Damages to Vehicle (Dkt. No. 29)	
22	and all attached declarations and exhibits, makes the following ruling:		
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IT IS ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is DISMISSED.

Background

In December 2009, Petitioner instituted this civil action (pursuant to FRCrP 41(g)) in connection with the seizure of her vehicle and other property which occurred when her son (Dimitrius Tinsley) was arrested in July 2009. At the time the indictment issued against Tinsley, the property seized from Petitioner's residence (including the vehicle in question) was listed in the "Allegations of Forfeiture." CR09-255; Dkt. No. 15, p. 4.

While her civil action was pending, Petitioner also filed a Petition for Release of Personal Property (pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)), in her son's criminal matter. <u>Id.</u>, Dkt. No. 59. An Ancillary Forfeiture Proceeding was eventually held in the criminal case and, as a result, Petitioner's vehicle was ordered returned to her. <u>Id.</u>, Dkt. No. 87. Petitioner alleges that it was returned to her with exterior and interior damage that was not present when the vehicle was seized. She seeks an assessment of damages against the government to cover the cost of restoring the vehicle to its condition at the time of seizure.

Discussion/Analysis

Petitioner's request suffers from two defects. In the first place, because the vehicle was seized pursuant to the "Allegations of Forfeiture" in the criminal indictment, it could not properly be the subject of a civil return of property proceeding. The law in the Ninth Circuit states that "an ancillary proceeding constitutes the <u>only</u> avenue for a third party claiming an interest in seized property." <u>United States v. Lazarenko</u>, 476 F.3d 642 (9th Cir. 2007)(emphasis supplied). This Court did not have jurisdiction over the vehicle in Petitioner's civil proceeding; this is further underscored by the fact that the vehicle was returned to her as part of the ancillary

proceeding in Tinsley's criminal matter. The Court notes that Petitioner does not even respond to this argument in her reply brief.

Secondly, because the ancillary criminal jurisdiction concludes upon the return of the property, Petitioner's only remedy at this point for the allegations of damage to the vehicle is via the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 38 U.S.C. § 2672 et seq. This would require Petitioner to satisfy the preliminary requirement of making an administrative claim (with the FBI) for the damages; denial of that administrative request would then lay the foundation for an FTCA claim in federal court. The government also argues that the circumstances of this case (a vehicle seized for the dual purposes of criminal investigation and forfeiture) qualify for an exemption to FTCA liability, but that issue is not before this Court.

Petitioner's only reply to this argument is to the effect that the FTCA does not constitute an "adequate remedy at law" because it would require Petitioner to incur legal fees which she cannot afford. Reply, p. 3. She cites no authority for this principle and (as mentioned above) makes no response at all to the government's argument that this Court does not have the option of exercising equitable jurisdiction pursuant to her civil cause of action.

While concurring with Petitioner that this is an unfortunate and potentially inequitable result, the Court must agree with the government that Petitioner has exhausted the possibilities presented by her son's criminal matter and the above-entitled civil suit concerning the property seized in the course of her son's arrest. She must find her remedy under the FTCA, if it exists at all.

Agreeing that there is no further jurisdiction and no issues remaining to be resolved, the Court has no alternative but to deny Petitioner's motion and to dismiss this action.

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2	The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel.	
3	Dated January 7, 2011.	
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5	Maisluf Relina	
6	Marsha J. Pechman	
7	United States District Judge	
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